27 January 1967 - The Findings
The following findings and recommendations of the Apollo 204 Review
Board were reported to James E. Webb, Administrator of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration on April 5, 1967:
(1)
1. FINDING:
|
*
|
There was a momentary power failure at 23:30:55
GMT.
|
|
*
|
Evidence of several arcs was found in the post-fire
investigation.
|
|
*
|
No single ignition source of the fire was conclusively
identified.
|
DETERMINATION:
The most probable initiator was an electrical arc in the sector between -Y and
+Z spacecraft axes. The exact location best fitting the total available
information is near the floor in the lower forward section of the left-hand
equipment bay where Environmental Control System (ECS) instrumentation power
wiring leads into the area between the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) and the
oxygen panel. No evidence was discovered that suggested sabotage.
2. FINDING:
|
*
|
The Command Module contained many types and classes of
combustible material in areas contiguous to possible ignition sources.
|
|
*
|
The test was conducted with a 16.7 pounds per square
inch absolute, 100-percent oxygen atmosphere.
|
DETERMINATION:
The test conditions were extremely hazardous.
RECOMMENDATION:
The amount and location of combustible materials in the Command Module must be
severely restricted and controlled.
3. FINDING:
|
*
|
The rapid spread of fire caused an increase in
pressure and temperature which resulted in rupture of the Command Module and
creation of a toxic atmosphere. Death of the crew was from asphyxia due
to inhalation of toxic gases due to fire. A contributory cause of death was
thermal burns.
|
|
*
|
Non-uniform distribution of carboxyhemoglobin was
found by autopsy.
|
DETERMINATION:
Autopsy data leads to the medical opinion that unconsciousness occurred rapidly
and that death followed soon thereafter.
4. FINDING:
|
*
|
Due to internal pressure, the Command Module inner
hatch could not be opened prior to rupture of the Command Module.
|
DETERMINATION:
The crew was never capable of effecting emergency egress because of the
pressurization before rupture and their loss of consciousness soon after
rupture.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the time required for egress of the crew be reduced and the operations
necessary for egress be simplified.
5. FINDING:
|
*
|
Those organizations responsible for the planning,
conduct and safety of this test failed to identify it as being hazardous.
Contingency preparations to permit escape or rescue of the crew from an
internal Command Module fire were not made.
|
|
*
|
No procedures for this type of emergency had been
established either for the crew or for the spacecraft pad work team.
|
|
*
|
The emergency equipment located in the White Room and
on the spacecraft work levels was not designed for the smoke condition
resulting from a fire of this nature.
|
|
*
|
Emergency fire, rescue and medical teams were not in
attendance.
|
|
*
|
Both the spacecraft work levels and the umbilical tower
access arm contain features such as steps, sliding doors and sharp turns in the
egress paths which hinder emergency operations.
|
DETERMINATION:
Adequate safety precautions were neither established nor observed for this
test.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
| * |
Management continually monitor the safety of all test
operations and assure the adequacy of emergency procedures.
|
| * |
All emergency equipment (breathing apparatus,
protective clothing, deluge systems, access arm, etc.) be reviewed for
adequacy.
|
| * |
Personnel training and practice for emergency
procedures be given on a regular basis and reviewed prior to the conduct of a
hazardous operation.
|
| * |
Service structures and umbilical towers be modified to
facilitate emergency operations.
|
6. FINDING:
Frequent interruptions and failures had been experienced in the overall
communication system during the operations preceding the accident.
DETERMINATION:
The overall communication system was unsatisfactory.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
| * |
The Ground Communication System be improved to assure
reliable communications between all test elements as soon as possible and
before the next manned flight.
|
| * |
A detailed design review be conducted on the entire
spacecraft communication system.
|
7. FINDING:
| * |
Revisions to the Operational Checkout Procedure for the
test were issued at 5:30 p.m. EST January 26, 1967 (209 pages) and 10:00 a.m.
EST January 27, 1967 (4 pages).
|
| * |
Differences existed between the Ground Test Procedures
and the In-Flight Check Lists.
|
DETERMINATION:
Neither the revision nor the differences contributed to the accident. The late
issuance of the revision, however, prevented test personnel from becoming
adequately familiar with the test procedure prior to its use.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
| * |
Test Procedures and Pilot's Checklists that represent
the actual Command Module configuration be published in final form and
reviewed early enough to permit adequate preparation and participation of
all test organization.
|
| * |
Timely distribution of test procedures and major
changes be made a constraint to the beginning of any test.
|
8. FINDING:
The fire in Command Module 012 was subsequently simulated closely by a test
fire in a full-scale mock-up.
DETERMINATION:
Full-scale mock-up fire tests can be used to give a realistic appraisal of fire
risks in flight-configured spacecraft.
RECOMMENDATION:
Full-scale mock-ups in flight configuration be tested to determine the risk of
fire.
9. FINDING:
The Command Module Environmental Control System design provides a pure oxygen
atmosphere.
DETERMINATION:
This atmosphere presents severe fire hazards if the amount and location of
combustibles in the Command Module are not restricted and controlled.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
| * |
The fire safety of the reconfigured Command Module be
established by full-scale mock-up test. |
| * |
Studies of the use of a diluent gas be continued with
particular reference to assessing the problems of gas detection and control and
the risk of additional operations that would be required in the use of a
two-gas atmosphere. |
10. FINDING:
Deficiencies existed in Command Module design, workmanship and quality control,
such as:
| * |
Components of the Environmental Control System
installed in Command Module 012 had a history of many removals and of
technical difficulties including regulator failures, line failures and
Environmental Control Unit failures. The design and installation features of
the Environmental Control Unit makes removal or repair difficult.
|
| * |
Coolant leakage at solder joints has been a chronic
problem. |
| * |
The coolant is both corrosive and combustible.
|
| * |
Deficiencies in design, manufacture, installation,
rework and quality control existed in the electrical wiring.
|
| * |
No vibration test was made of a complete
flight-configured spacecraft.
|
| * |
Spacecraft design and operating procedures currently
require the disconnecting of electrical connections while powered.
|
| * |
No design features for fire protection were
incorporated.
|
DETERMINATION:
These deficiencies created an unnecessarily hazardous condition and their
continuation would imperil any future Apollo operations.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
| * |
An in-depth review of all elements, components and
assemblies of the Environmental Control System be conducted to assure its
functional and structural integrity and to minimize its contribution to fire
risk.
|
| * |
Present design of soldered joints in plumbing be
modified to increase integrity or the joints be replaced with a more
structurally reliable configuration.
|
| * |
Deleterious effects of coolant leakage and spillage be
eliminated.
|
| * |
Review of specifications be conducted, 3-dimensional
jigs be used in manufacture of wire bundles and rigid inspection at all stages
of wiring design, manufacture and installation be enforced.
|
| * |
Vibration tests be conducted of a flight-configured
spacecraft.
|
| * |
The necessity for electrical connections or
disconnections with power on within the crew compartment be eliminated.
|
| * |
Investigation be made of the most effective means of
controlling and extinguishing a spacecraft fire. Auxiliary breathing oxygen and
crew protection from smoke and toxic fumes be provided.
|
11. FINDING:
An examination of operating practices showed the following examples
of problem areas:
| * |
The number of the open items at the time of shipment of
the Command Module 012 was not known. There were 113 significant Engineering
Orders not accomplished at the time Command Module 012 was delivered to NASA;
623 Engineering Orders were released subsequent to delivery. Of these, 22 were
recent releases which were not recorded in configuration records at the time of
the accident.
|
| * |
Established requirements were not followed with regard
to the pre-test constraint list. The list was not completed and signed by
designated contractor and NASA personnel prior to the test, even though oral
agreement to proceed was reached.
|
| * |
Formulation of and changes to pre-launch test
requirements for the Apollo spacecraft program were unresponsive to changing
conditions.
|
| * |
Non-certified equipment items were installed in the
Command Module at time of test.
|
| * |
Discrepancies existed between NAA and NASA MSC
specifications regarding inclusion and positioning of flammable
materials.
|
| * |
The test specifications were released in August 1966 and not updated to include accumulated changes...
|
DETERMINATION:
Problems of program management and relationships between Centers and with the
contractor have led in some cases to insufficient response to changing program
requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Every effort must be made to insure the maximum clarification and understanding
of the responsibilities of all the organizations involved, the objective being
a fully coordinated and efficient program.
|